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Abstract
We model opportunities in society as chances of success, that is as they are commonly
described by practitioners. We show that a classical liberal principle of justice together with
a limited principle of social rationality imply that the social objective should be to maximise
the chance that everybody in society succeeds. Technically, this means using a Nashwelfare
criterion. A particular consequence is that the failure of even only one individual must be
considered maximally detrimental. We also study a renement of this criterion and its
extension to problems of intergenerational justice.
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Until all people are happy, there is no individual happinessKenji Miyazawa
(1896-1933)
1 Introduction
Opportunitiesare a central concept both in the public discourse and in economics. In this
paper we propose a new approach to model this concept. We assume that each individual
is regarded as a binary experiment with either successor failureas possible outcomes.
Then, opportunities in society are expressed by the prole of chances of success across
individuals. By means of this simplication, we are able to o¤er several insights on the issue
of the allocation of opportunities. For example, what is the social cost of one person in
society not having any chance of success? Is it conceivable that such a sacrice be justied
by a su¢ cient increase in opportunities for the rest of society? Our theoretical framework
o¤ers insights to address this type of questions.
In our approach, we view people with more opportunities as people who face more
favourable circumstances, and who, as a consequence, will tend to succeed more frequently.
This meaning of the term opportunitiestallies with natural language,1 and also with the
interpretation of the social policy literature. Here, a single individual is a representative of
a class or of a category. When in a social policy study it is claimed that some category of
individuals has low opportunities, what is meant is that the probability of success (in some
dimension) of an individual extracted at random from that category is lower than some
benchmark. So it is quite common to read statements of this kind: An adolescent of ethnic
origin X and social background Y has half the average chances to be eventually admitted
into a top university.2 On this interpretation there is no mention of e¤ort, responsibility
or talent. Politicians frequently speak the language of chances.3
Academic economists too sometimes emphasise the favourable juncture of circumstances
1Consider the Websters denition of an opportunity: a favourable juncture of circumstances. Similarly,
in the Oxford Dictionary: a good chance; a favourable occasion.
2The literature is too vast for a comprehensive set of references. See for example Mayer [34] and Duncan
and Murnane [15], whose very titles both refer to childrens life chances.
3For example, Tony Blair: If we are in politics for one thing it is to make sure that all children are given
the best chance in life. (Labour Party conference speech, September 1999); J. F. Kennedy: The Negro
baby born in America today...has about one-half as much chance of completing a high school as a white baby
born in the same place on the same day, one-third as much chance of completing college, one-third as much
chance of becoming a professional man, twice as much chance of becoming unemployed, about one-seventh
as much chance of earning $10,000 a year(Civil Rights Address, June 1963). In a major independent report
Frank Field [16] (a Labour MP) writes that improving the life chances of under ves is the key to cutting
social inequality.
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aspect of opportunities. Notably, Deatons [12] notion of escape is not distant from our
notion of success. However, economists have more often adopted more sophisticated and
indirect views of the notion of opportunity. Concepts such as talent and responsibility are
placed at the forefront.4 It is also usually taken as a given that opportunities, once properly
formulated, should be equalised.
In this paper we try to take seriously the direct interpretation of practitioners. This
approach, while lacking the sophistication of other approaches, has the advantage of inter-
preting opportunities in a way that is amenable to straightforward measurement. A target
for social policy to equalise the proportion of students in top schools among the various
ethnic groups, or the proportion in high-level jobs of students from di¤erent types of schools,
is concrete and easy to understand and verify empirically, in a way in which, say, equalise
capabilities across ethnic groupsis not.5
Our simplication pays o¤ with some interesting insights in respect of a well-known
di¢ culty with justifying egalitarian principles. Equalisation of any value measure across
individuals can always be criticised (just like simple welfare egalitarianism) on the grounds
that many individuals might have to face large aggregate losses for the sake of increasing only
marginally the value for one individual. Our analysis, however, leads to a preference for some
degree of equality that does not stem from the nature of the equalisandum(opportunities
as opposed to welfare), but rather from outside the stock of egalitarian principles, via a
classical liberal Harm principle.
This principle is liberal because it asserts a form of non-interference with individuals
in society. The details are explained in section 3, but its core is the requirement that an
individual who has su¤ered damage without harming others should not be interfered with.
By means of this and other properties we characterise some Nash-likecriteria: society
should, broadly speaking, maximise the product of opportunities.6 In the usual setting of
social welfare, a drawback of the Nash product is that it raises a di¢ culty of interpretation
about the object that is being maximised: what does a product of utilities mean? In contrast,
classical criteria such as the Utilitarian and maximin ones are clearly interpretable as total
4The literature here is vast too: an illustrative but far from comprehensive selection of contributions
includes: Sen [42]; Fleurbaey [17, 18, 19]; Herrero [24]; Bossert and Fleurbaey [9]; Kranich [26]; Roemer
[39, 40]; Laslier et al. [27]; Moreno-Ternero and Roemer [36]. This paper is closer in spirit to Bénabou and
Ok [6] as they do not refer to responsibility. However, our focus is di¤erent in that we attempt to derive the
desirability of equality from rst principles.
5Our analysis here continues a research programme started in Mariotti and Veneziani [31], where we
explored the notion of opportunities as chances in life and characterised a utilitarian ordering. Unlike in the
latter contribution, however, we focus on ethical properties capturing a liberal perspective in social choice.
6It is standard in the social choice literature to call Nash orderings the binary relations that aggregate
multiplicatively (see, e.g., Moulin [37], p.37 and Roemer [39], pp.61¤), and so we follow this convention.
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utility or the utility of the worst o¤.7 In our framework the Nash product, too, acquires
a transparent meaning: to maximise the Nash product means to maximise the probability
that everybody in society succeeds under the assumption that the individuals are independent
experiments.8
An interesting feature of the Nash criterion in a context of opportunity proles is a
strongly egalitarian implication. In fact, it is su¢ cient for a prole to include one agent who
fails with certainty for this prole to be at the bottom of the social ranking (no matter how
many other individuals succeed). This answers the question of the opening paragraph.
Furthermore, we address a renement issue. The straightforward application of the Nash
criterion su¤ers from some lack of discriminatory power at the boundaries: we cannot dis-
tinguish situations where many individuals fail from situations in which only one of them
fails (only weak, and not strong, Pareto is satised on the set of proles in which some of
the individuals fail). To address this issue, we also formulate a new variant of the Nash
criterion, the Two-Step Nash criterion. This criterion renes the indi¤erence classes and
satises strong Pareto.
In the appendix, we extend our analysis to situations where the number of agents is
innite. This is relevant in intergenerational allocation problems. A concrete example of
successfor a generation is the ability to enjoy a clean environment. At a much more ab-
stract level, in an Aristotelianperspective, self-realisation - intended as developing human
capacities - could be taken as the fundamental objective of mankind. In this interpretation,
the probability of success of a generation is the probability that the generation will develop
its inherently human capacities.9 At the formal level, the main novelty is the introduction
of the Nash catching up and the Nash overtaking criteria. This part of the analysis ts in
a voluminous stream of recent work (including Alcantud [1], Asheim and Banerjee [3], Basu
and Mitra [5], Bossert et al [10]. For a detailed survey, see Asheim [2]), and is necessarily
more technical in nature.
7Provided of course that the appropriate assumptions on the comparability of the units and origin of the
utility scale are made.
8Note that the independence assumption just concerns the interpretation of our model. It is not a formal
assumption that underlies the formal results. We discuss independence in the conclusions.
9Indeed, our formal framework can be equivalently interpreted as focusing on the degree (in a scale from
0 to 1) of self-realisation (or success) of each generation or the proportion of individuals in a given generation
who realise their potential (or are successful). More generally, although we believe that an interpretation of
opportunities as chances does provide interesting new insights on a variety of social issues, from a strictly
formal viewpoint, our analysis applies to any setting in which the measure of advantage lies in the [0; 1]
interval. So, for example, our notion of opportunities could be related to that of QALYs used in the health
literature. We discuss this aspect in section 8. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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2 Opportunities in the box of life
There is a nite set of agents N = f1; 2; :::; Tg in society. An opportunity for individual t in
N is a number between 0 and 1. This number is interpreted as a chance of successeither
in some given eld or in life as a whole,10 so that opportunities can be manipulated just
as probabilities. We are interested in how opportunities should be allocated among the T
individuals. The underlying idea is that some (limited) resources (possibly money) can be
allocated so as to inuence the distribution of opportunities.11 An opportunity prole (or
simply a prole) is a point in the box of lifeBT = [0; 1]T . A prole a = (a1; a2; :::; aT ) 2 BT
lists the opportunities, or chances of successof agents in N if a is chosen.
The points 0 = (0; 0; :::; 0) 2 BT and 1 = (1; 1; :::; 1) 2 BT can be thought of as Hell (no
opportunities for anybody) and Heaven (full opportunities for everybody), respectively. We
will also say that individual t is in Hell (resp., Heaven) at a if at = 0 (resp., at = 1). Let
BT+ =

a 2 BT ja 0	 denote the interior of the box of life.12
A permutation  is a bijection of N onto itself. For any a 2 BT and any permutation
, denote a =
 
a(t)

t2N , which we call a permutation of a. For all a 2 BT , let a be the
permutation of a which ranks its elements in ascending order.
We aim to specify desirable properties for a social opportunity relation <S on the box of
life BT .13
Two properties for <S are the following, for all a; b 2 BT :
Strong Pareto: a > b ) a S b:
Anonymity: a = b for some permutation  ) a S b.
These properties are standard and will not be discussed further. We now dene the two
relations on the box of life that are the main object of this study.14 For all a; b 2 BT , the
10Leading examples of successthat appear in the social policy literature are the following: no teenage
childbearing; not dropping out of school; attainment of x years of formal education; attainment of fraction
 of the average hourly wage, or yearly income; no male idleness (this is dened in Mayer [34] as the
condition of a 24-year old not in school and not having done paid work during the previous year); no single
motherhood. In a health context, success may be dened, for instance, by: surviving until age y; surviving
a given operation; (for a group) mortality and morbidity below percentage  of a reference groups average;
good health (vs. death), as in the standard gamble of the QALYs approach. In a social psychology
context, success may be related to reported happiness being within a certain quantile of the population.
And so on.
11See Mayer [34] for an interesting counterpoint to the e¤ect of money on childrens life chances.
12Vector notation: for all a; b 2 BT we write a  b to mean at  bt, for all t 2 N ; a > b to mean a  b
and a 6= b; and a b to mean at > bt, for all t 2 N .
13Given a binary relation < on a set X and x; y 2 X, we write x  y (the asymmetric factor) if and only
if x < y and y 6< x, and we write x s y (the symmetric part) if and only if x < y and y < x.
14We recall here some standard terminology. A binary relation < on a set X is said to be: reexive if,
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Nash social opportunity ordering <N aggregates chances of success by multiplication:
a <N b,
TY
t=1
at 
TY
t=1
bt:
Next, we introduce a new renement of the Nash ordering on the boundary of the box
of life, which we call the Two-Step Nash social opportunity ordering <2N . For all
a 2 BT , let P a = ft 2 N : at > 0g and let jP aj denote the cardinality of P a. Then for all
a; b 2 BT :
a  2N b, either jP aj > jP bj;
or jP aj = jP bj &
Y
t2Pa
at >
Y
t2P b
bt.
Thus also:
a 2N b,  jP aj = jP bj &  Y
t2Pa
at =
Y
t2P b
bt
!
;
which includes the case jP aj = jP bj = 0 and a = b = 0.15 So, the Two-Step Nash ordering
is equivalent to the standard Nash ordering when at least one prole is on the interior of
the box of life, but unlike the standard Nash ordering it does not consider all proles on the
boundary indi¤erent to each other. If at least one of the two proles has (at least) a zero
component we count the positive entries. If they have the same number of positive entries,
we apply Nash to them. If not, then the prole with the higher number of positive entries
is preferred.
3 A Non-Interference Principle
Imagine that success is achieved by overcoming a series of hurdles. For example, in order
to be succesful in becoming a doctor, being a dustmans daughter combines hurdles that a
doctors son does not face (less favourable studying environment, lack of a high-level social
network, possibly gender, and so on). A di¤erent example comes from Deatons [12] idea of
escape we mentioned earlier. It is instructive to cite the list of lucksthat Deaton deems
crucial for his fathers success (escape), because it is a concrete illustration of the to success
through hurdlesview that we propose here:
for any x 2 X, x < x; complete if, for any x; y 2 X, x 6= y implies x < y or y < x; transitive if, for any
x; y; z 2 X, x < y < z implies x < z. < is a quasi-ordering if it is reexive and transitive, while < is an
ordering if it is a complete quasi-ordering.
15We use the convention that
Q
t2Pa at =
Q
t2P b bt = 1 when P
a = P b = ?.
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the luck not to be among those who died as children, the luck to be rescued
from the pit by the war, the luck not to be on the wrong commando raid, the luck
not to die from tuberculosis, and the luck to get a job in an easy labor market
([12], Preface).
Observe that our view of success can encompass two distinct types of situations. In one,
hurdles are eventsthat can happen to individuals (e.g. being drafted in the army). In the
other, they are more like given individual characteristics (e.g. being a dustmans daughter).16
We consider hurdles such that the addition or removal of a hurdle has a multiplicative
e¤ect on the probability of success.17 With this interpretation in mind, the next axiom
imposes some minimal limits on the interference of society on an individuals opportunities.
We assume that an individual has the right to prevent society from acting against her in
all circumstances of reduction in her opportunities (due to an increase in the hurdles she
faces), whenever the opportunities of no other individual are a¤ected. By acting against her
we mean a switch against the individual in societys strict rankings of the chance proles,
with respect to the ranking of the original proles (before the change in hurdles for the
individual under consideration occurred). Crucially, the principle says nothing on societys
possible actions aimed at increasing the individuals opportunities: an individual facing
additional hurdles cannot demand (on the basis of our axiom) to be compensated by a
switch of societys ranking in her favour. In this sense the principle we propose is libertarian
rather than egalitarian.18
Probabilistic Harm Principle: Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT be such that a S b and, for some
t 2 N and for some  2 (0; 1),
a0t =   at;
b0t =   bt;
a0j = aj, for all j 6= t;
b0j = bj, for all j 6= t:
16Obviously whether a given event is a hurdle depends on individual circumstances: for somebody who
already has a job with good career prospects rather than a mining job in Scotland, being drafted in the army
would be a hurdle, not an advantage.
17In other words, all hurdles whose e¤ects are correlated are lumped together. For example, surviving
tubercolosis and being drafted in the army can be considered non-correlated and thus separate hurdles, like
being female and having a dustman father.
18In Mariotti and Veneziani [30], we explore a more radical formalisation of the principle, applied not to
chances but to welfare levels, in which the no harmconclusion follows even when the reduction in welfare
is not proportional. This leads to the leximin principle. (See also Lombardi et al [28] for an extension.)
From a philosophical viewpoint, we interpret this principle as an incarnation of J.S. Mills Harm Principle.
We dwell on philosophical issues in Mariotti and Veneziani [33].
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Then b0 S a0 whenever a0t > b0t.
In other words, when comparing two pairs of proles interpreted as involving losses of
opportunities for only individual t from an initial situation a; b to a nal situation a0; b0 as
described, there are three possibilities:
 Individual t is compensated for her loss (society abandons the strict preference for ts
lower-chances prole).
 Individual t is not harmed further beyond the given opportunity damage (society
prefers always the lower-chances or always the higher-chances prole for t).
 Individual t is punished (society switches preference from ts higher-chances prole to
ts lower-chances prole).
What the Probabilistic Harm Principle does is to exclude the third possibility. Soci-
etys choice should not become less favourable to somebody solely because her position has
worsened, without a¤ecting othersopportunities.
Observe how in formulating this principle the cause of the reduction in opportunities for
individual t (i.e. the specic hurdles that are raised) is completely ignored. It may have
happened because of carelessness or because of sheer bad luck. All that matters is that the
other individuals are not a¤ected by individual ts change.
Note also the conclusion b0 S a0 in the statement of the axiom. The veto power of
the individual whose opportunities have decreased is limited, in that she cannot impose on
society a ranking in complete agreement with her chances. This feature becomes especially
relevant if we allow <S to be incomplete (as in the impossibility results below), for in this
case b0 S a0 does not imply a0 <S b0 and thus the requirement of the axiom becomes even
weaker: the individual cannot prevent society from declaring the two alternatives either
indi¤erent or noncomparable in the face of her strict preference.
At the formal level, observe that we allow for the possibility that bt = b0t = 0. Below
we also explore another liberal axiom in which we require bt > 0. This is important from
both the theoretical and the analytical viewpoint. Theoretically, the question is whether the
principle should be restricted to situations where a damage occurs in the strict sense, i.e.
where opportunities strictly decrease. This may seem reasonable, but maybe it is not. If
bt = 0, - so that an agent would be in Hell both before and after the harm, should society
choose against her, - changing social preferences to b0 S a0 might be regarded as a very
heavy punishment indeed on the logic of the Probabilistic Harm Principle.
Because the Probabilistic Harm Principle protects individuals from interference after a
reduction in their opportunities, it may be tempting to conclude that it incorporates some
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form of minimal inequality aversion, or a moderate form of priority for the worse-o¤. At a
closer look, however, the strongly individualistic and non-aggregative nature of the Principle
suggests that this interpretation is misleading: the Probabilistic Harm Principle focuses on
changes in the situation of a single agent while keeping everyone else indi¤erent, and ignores
all information about both individual opportunity levels and di¤erences in opportunity levels
between individuals. Indeed, there exist several non-egalitarian or even anti-egalitarian social
opportunity orderings that satisfy the Principle:
 Universal indi¤erence: in this ordering all states in the box of life are indi¤erent.
It satises Anonymity and (vacuously) the Probabilistic Harm Principle while being
denitionally insensitive to any equity considerations.
 Su¢ cientarianism: let  2 B denote an (ethically determined) threshold denot-
ing a su¢ cient, or satisfactory chance of success in life, and for all a 2 BT , let
P a() = fi 2 N : ai  g denote the set of individuals who have a su¢ cientchance
of success at prole a. Then, for all a; b 2 BT : a < b, jP a()j  P b(). The su¢ -
cientarian ordering < satises Anonymity and the Probabilistic Harm Principle, but
it incorporates no concern for equality.19 Indeed, su¢ cientarianism has explicitly been
proposed as an alternative to egalitarianism and embodies the intuition that equality
is not, as such, of particular moral importance(Frankfurt [21], p.21).
 Lexicographic dictatorships: these satisfy Strong Pareto and the Probabilistic Harm
Principle, but are in direct conict with any egalitarian (or even fairness) concerns.20
Observe that none of these three example orderings has a multiplicative structure à la
Nash. This structure will emerge in our characterisations through the joint action of the
Probabilistic Harm Principle together with other axioms.
4 Impossibilities
When attempting to apply the Probabilistic Harm Principle - together with the other ba-
sic requirements of Anonymity and Strong Pareto - we are immediately confronted with a
di¢ culty.
19It is easy to show, for example, that < violates both the Pigou-Dalton condition and the so-called
Hammond Equity axiom (Hammond [22]).
20Formally, lexicographic dictatorships are dened as follows. Let L be a given permutation of N and
for all a 2 BT , let aL = La. Then, for all a; b 2 BT , a L b, aL = b L and a L b, either aL1 > bL1 , or
there is t0 > 1 : aLt = b
L
t , for all t < t
0, and aLt0 > b
L
t0 . The class of lexicographic dictatorships is identied
varying L.
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Theorem 1. There exists no transitive social opportunity relation <S on BT that satises
Anonymity, Strong Pareto, and Probabilistic Harm Principle.
Proof : By example. Consider the proles
a = (a1; 0; x; x; :::; x) ; b = (0; b2; x; x; :::; x) ;
where 1  a1 > b2 > 0 and x 2 [0; 1], so that a; b 2 BT . By Anonymity and Strong
Pareto, together with transitivity, we have a S b.
Consider next the following proles obtained from a; b:
a0 = (a01; 0; x; x; :::; x) ; b
0 = b = (0; b2; x; x; :::; x)
where a01 = a1, b
0
1 = b1 = 0, for some  2 (0; 1) such that a1 < b2. Since a0; b0 2 BT and
a1 > b1, then by Probabilistic Harm Principle, it follows that b0 S a0. However, by
Anonymity and Strong Pareto, together with transitivity, b0 S a0, a contradiction.
Observe that this result holds for social opportunity relations which are possibly incom-
plete. And even transitivity can be dispensed with, provided that Anonymity and Strong
Pareto are replaced by the following axiom.
Suppes-Sen Grading Principle: If a > b for some permutation  then a S b.
Corollary 1. There exists no social opportunity relation <S on BT that satises Suppes-
Sen Grading Principle and Probabilistic Harm Principle.
Proof : Straightforward modication of the previous proof.
It is worth noting that previous impossibility results concerning the application of the
Nash criterion in the context of welfare orderings focus on axioms of a di¤erent nature,
emphasising the role of continuity and ratio-scale invariance (see, e.g., Tsui and Weymarks
[43] Theorem 1). The Probabilistic Harm Principle is logically strictly weaker than ratio-
scale invariance (beside being interpreted very di¤erently), given the restrictions a0t > b
0
t and
especially  2 (0; 1). In addition to that, the consequent in the statement of the axiom only
requires that societys strict preference should not be reversed (which in our case allows both
for indi¤erence and for noncomparability). A further di¤erence concerns the fact that, as
noted, we dispense with both the completeness and the transitivity of <S.21
The result originates in the structure of the space of alternatives and the properties of
the boundary of the box of life, coupled with the fact that the Probabilistic Harm Principle
21An equivalent of Theorem 1 holds also for innite societies using Finite Anonymity and the innite
version of the Probabilistic Harm Principle dened in the Appendix.
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applies also to proles on the boundary, and to boundary values bt = 0. In this sense,
while the impossibility is formally robust, in that it holds for several combinations of similar
axioms (e.g. Strong Pareto in the statement could be weakened in some ways) we do not
deem it as expressing any deep contradiction between normative principles.
In the sequel we explore two specic ways in which the principles can be essentially
reconciled. The rst strategy consists of weakening Strong Pareto. For all a; b 2 BT :22
Pareto: a > b ) a <S b and a b ) a S b:
Weakening Strong Pareto to Pareto makes room for the addition of another desirable
principle of social rationality.
5 Social Rationality
The new type of property we examine concerns the rationalityof the social opportunity
relation. Consider rst an axiom analogous to the sure-thing type of principle underlying
Harsanyis [23] defense of Utilitarianism (in a welfare context):
Sure Thing: Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT . If a <S b and a0 <S b0, then
8 2 (0; 1) : a+ (1  ) a0 <S b+ (1  ) b0;
with a + (1  ) a0 S b + (1  ) b0 if at least one of the two preferences in the premise
is strict.
Sure Thing is a classic independence property, and it can be justied in a standard way
as follows. Denote the compound proles a00 = a+ (1  ) a0 and b00 = b+ (1  ) b0. The
prole a00 can be thought of as being obtained by means of a two-stage lottery: rst, an
event E can occur with probability . Then, if E occurs the prole is a, and otherwise it is
a0. And b00 can be described analogously, as a compound event conditional on the occurrence
or not of E. Then, when choosing between a00 and b00, it seems natural to adhere to this
decomposition: if E occurs, it would have been better to choose a00 since a is better than b;
and if E does not occur it would also have been better to choose a00 since a0 is better than
b0. Therefore, a00 should be regarded as better than b00 before knowing whether E occurs or
not.
We think that a property akin to Sure Thing should be imposed, but that, in its full force,
it displays some ethically unattractive features. The following argument may be reminiscent
22This is property S1 in Diamonds [13] classic paper.
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of the classic Diamond critiqueof the similar property in Harsanyis Utilitarianism23 (note
that a Utilitarian social opportunity ordering would satisfy Sure Thing). Consider:
a = a0 = b0 = (0; 1) ; b = (1; 0) ,  =
1
2
:
Then if Anonymity applies we have
a S b0 S a0 S b;
and by Sure Thing
a00 = (0; 1) S

1
2
;
1
2

= b00:
But having one individual in Hell and the other in Heaven for sure can hardly be reasonably
regarded as socially indi¤erent to both individuals being half way between Heaven and Hell
in the box of life. As Diamond ([14], p.766) would put it, [b00] seems strictly preferable to
me since it gives 1 a fair share while [a00] does not.
The reason for this unacceptable situation is, obviously, that mixingopportunities across
di¤erent individuals may produce ethically relevant e¤ects. The problem of properties like
Sure Thing, both in a utility context and in the present one, is precisely the potentially
benecial e¤ect of this sort of diagonal mixingin the box of life.
However, the property is immune from this line of criticism when the allowable mixings
are restricted to ones that are parallel to the edges of the box: namely, the compound
lotteries only concern a single individual. This seems to capture a position à la Diamond: I
am willing to accept the sure-thing principle for individual choice but not for social choice
([14], p.766).
The following weakening of Sure Thing is then responsive to the Diamond critique:
Individual Sure Thing: Let a; b 2 BT be such that a <S b and let a0; b0 2 BT be such
that there exists t 2 N such that a0j = aj and b0j = bj, for all j 6= t, and a0 <S b0. Then
8 2 (0; 1) : a+ (1  ) a0 <S b+ (1  ) b0;
with a + (1  ) a0 S b + (1  ) b0 if at least one of the two preferences in the premise
is strict.
6 Nash Retrouvé
Before proving the main characterisation result of this section, we establish a preliminary
result, which is of interest in its own right. The Lemma proves that any two proles that
23See also Fleurbaey [20]. To avoid confusions, we point out that Harsanyi and Diamond were discussing
the application of the independence axiom to the lottery of social outcomes, while here the focus is on the
vector of lotteries faced by individuals.
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imply Hell for at least one individual are socially indi¤erent (we address this feature in the
next section).
Lemma 1 Let the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satisfy Anonymity, Pareto,
Probabilistic Harm Principle, and Individual Sure Thing. Then, for all a; b 2 BT :
[at = 0; bt0 = 0, some t; t0 2 N ]) a S b:
Proof : Consider any a; b 2 BT such that at = 0; bt0 = 0, some t; t0 2 N . Suppose,
without loss of generality, that T > z = jP bj  jP aj, and denote h = jP bj   jP aj. We
proceed by induction on h.
1. (h = 0) Let T > jP bj = jP aj = z. If z = 0, then the result follows from reexivity. If
z > 0 and there is a permutation  such that a = b, the result follows from Anonymity.
Therefore suppose that z > 0 and there is no permutation  such that a = b. Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that a S b. By completeness, and without loss of generality, suppose
that a S b. By Anonymity and transitivity, we can focus on the ranked proles a; b where
by assumption:
a = (0; 0; :::; 0; al; :::; aT ) ; b =
 
0; 0; :::; 0; bl; :::; bT

;
and z = T   l + 1. We need to consider two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that a > b and consider any k, l  k  T , such that ak > bk. Consider
a prole a which is a permutation  of a such that a1 = ak, a

k = a1 = 0, and all other
entries are the same. By Anonymity and transitivity, a S b.
Then, consider the proles a0; b0 2 BT obtained from a; b as follows: a01 = a1 = ak < bk,
b01 = b1 = 0, for some  2 (0; 1), and a0j = aj , b0j = bj all j 6= 1. Since a01 > b01,
Probabilistic Harm Principle implies a0 <S b0. Therefore by Individual Sure Thing,
a = a + (1  ) a0 S b + (1  ) b0 = b, for all  2 (0; 1). Since a1 = ak > bk and
a01 < bk, it follows that there is 
 2 (0; 1) such that a1 = bk. Let  1 be the inverse of
permutation  and let a1 =  1a

. By Anonymity and transitivity, a1 S b.
If for all j 6= k; l  j  T , aj = bj, then a1 = b and we obtain a contradiction by
reexivity. If, instead, there is k0 6= k such that ak0 > bk0, then the same argument can be
applied iteratively m times to all entries of a such that aj > bj to obtain a prole am 2 BT
such that am S b, but am = b, yielding a contradiction by reexivity.
Case 2. Suppose that there exists some k, l  k  T , such that ak < bk. Let L
 
a; b

=
j 2 Njaj < bj
	
. Then consider the prole b
0 2 BT such that b0j = bj for all j =2 L
 
a; b

and
b
0
j = aj, for all j 2 L
 
a; b

. By Pareto together with transitivity, it follows that a S b0.
Then the same argument as in case 1 can be applied to derive the desired contradiction.
2. (Inductive step) Suppose the result holds for T   1 > h  1  0. Consider a; b 2 BT
such that jP bj < T and jP bj   jP aj = h > 0. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that a S b.
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By completeness, suppose that a S b. By Anonymity and transitivity, we can focus on
the ranked proles a; b where by construction:
a = (0; 0; :::; 0; al; :::; aT ) ; b =
 
0; 0; :::; 0; bl h; :::; bT

;
with l > l   h > 1. Then consider the prole a0 2 BT which is obtained from a as follows:
a0j = aj, for all j 6= l   1, and a0l 1 2 (0; 1]: a0 =
 
0; 0; :::; a0l 1; al; :::; aT

. By construction
jP bj jP a0j = h 1  0 and thus by the induction hypothesis, a0 S b. Then, by Individual
Sure Thing, it follows that a = a + (1  ) a0 S b = b + (1  ) b, for all  2 (0; 1).
However, since jP bj   jP aj = h   1 it must be a S b by the induction hypothesis, a
contradiction.
A similar argument rules out the possibility that b S a.
Given Lemma 1, we can now show that an ordering in the box of life can be completely
characterised by the four axioms discussed before.24
Theorem 2. A social opportunity ordering <S on BT satises Anonymity, Pareto,
Probabilistic Harm Principle, and Individual Sure Thing if and only if <S is the
Nash ordering <N .
Proof : ()) It is immediate that the Nash ordering <N satises all four axioms.
(() Suppose that the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satises Anonymity,
Pareto, Probabilistic Harm Principle, and Individual Sure Thing. For any a; b 2 BT ,
we rst prove that a N b ) a S b holds, and then invoke Pareto to prove that
a N b) a S b also holds.
1. Suppose that a; b 2 BT are such that QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt. If QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt = 1,
then a S b follows from reexivity. IfQTt=1 at =QTt=1 bt = 0, then it follows from Lemma 1.
2. Therefore suppose that 1 >
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt > 0. If there exists a permutation 
such that a = b, then the result follows from Anonymity. Therefore, suppose that there
exists no permutation  such that a = b, and suppose, by way of contradiction, that a S b.
By completeness, and without loss of generality, suppose that a S b.
Let U(a; b) = ft 2 Nj at > btg and L(a; b) = ft 2 Nj at < btg. By construction, U(a; b) 6=
? and L(a; b) 6= ?. Take any k 2 U(a; b) and l 2 L(a; b). Then, from a; b construct a1; b1 as
follows: let a1k = ak, and b
1
l = bl, where  = max

bk
ak
; al
bl

, and let a1j = aj all j 6= k, and
b1j = bj all j 6= l. Note that 0 <  < 1 by construction and so a1; b1 2 BT . We prove that
a1 S b1.
24The axioms in Theorem 2, and indeed in all characterisation results below, can be shown to be indepen-
dent. The details are available from the authors upon request.
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3. Consider a prole b which is a permutation  of b such that bk = bl. By Anonymity
and transitivity, a S b. Then, consider proles a0; b0 2 BT such that a0k = 0, b0k = 0, and
a0j = aj; b
0
j = b

j for all j 6= k. By Lemma 1, a0 S b0. Therefore by Individual Sure Thing,
a = a + (1   )a0 S b = b + (1   )b0, for all  2 (0; 1). Note that for all  2 (0; 1),
ak = ak, b

k = b

k = bl, and a

j = aj, b

j = b

j , for all j 6= k. Hence, a1 S b1 follows from
Anonymity and transitivity by setting  = .
4. By construction 1 >
QT
t=1 a
1
t =
QT
t=1 b
1
t > 0 and
E(a; b) = ft 2 Nj at = btg  E(a1; b1) =

t 2 Nj a1t = b1t
	
If U = fkg and L = flg, then bk
ak
= al
bl
and so E(a1; b1) = N , yielding the desired
contradiction by reexivity. Otherwise, the previous argument can be iterated m times to
obtain proles am; bm 2 BT such that am S bm, but E(am; bm) = N , which again yields a
contradiction by reexivity.
5. This proves that for all a; b 2 BT , a N b implies a S b. The proof is completed in a
routine way by invoking Pareto and transitivity.
The interpretation of the Nash social opportunity ordering is of interest. In the present
framework, each individual is a binary experiment, with outcome either success or failure.
Imagining that such experiments are independent, the requirement to maximise the Nash
ordering means that chances in life should be allocated so as to maximise the probability that
everybody succeeds. As a particular implication, the failure of even only one individual must
be considered as maximally detrimental.
Contrast this attempt to maximise the probability of Heaven with a Utilitarian type of
ordering, which would maximise the sum of probabilities. In the proposed interpretation,
that would amount to maximising the expected number of successes. Clearly, such a method
would be biased, compared to the one proposed, against a minority of individuals with very
low probability of success.
It is also interesting to compare the use of the Nash ordering in the present framework to
that in a standard utility framework. In the latter, there are two problems of interpretation.
Firstly, the meaning of a product of utilities is unclear (as noted, e.g., by Rubinstein
[41]25). In a welfare world the Utilitarian process of aggregation has a naturalmeaning,
which the Nash product lacks. But in a world of chances, a process of aggregation by product
is equally natural.
25The formula of the Nash bargaining solution lacks a clear meaning. What is the interpretation of the
product of two von Neumann Morgenstern utility numbers? (p. 82). The interpretation he goes on to
propose is related to non-cooperative bargaining. Here we are rather interested in an interpretation of the
Nash ordering as an ethical allocation method. A di¤erent interpretation in this vein is in Mariotti [29].
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Secondly, the maximisation of the Nash product on the positive orthant requires the
external specication of a welfare zero. In a bargaining context, this is assumed to be the
disagreement point; but its determination in a general social choice context is unclear, and
it must be based on some external argument. On the contrary, the structure of the box of
life, with its internal zero, makes this problem vanish.
7 The Two-Step Nash Ordering
A drawback of the Nash ordering - a consequence of relaxing Strong Pareto - is that it yields
some very large indi¤erence classes by considering all points on the boundary of the box of
life as equally good (or bad). This may be deemed undesirable from an ethical perspective,
and it may be a disadvantage for practical applications. For, a prole where all agents
(potentially a very large number of individuals) are in Hell can hardly be seen as indi¤erent
to one in which only one of them su¤ers.
In this section, we explore another way out of the impossibility in which Strong Pareto
is not abandoned. This requires some adjustments in the axiomatic system. We restrict
the application of the Probabilistic Harm Principle to strictly positive probabilities (as we
discussed in section 3, this may be a reasonable restriction). Moreover, the same liberal
logic that underlies the Probabilistic Harm Principle can be argued to extend to the case
of improvements in individual opportunities, without being restricted to harms. The new
Probabilistic Non-Interference principle below incorporates this extension.26
Probabilistic Non-Interference: Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT be such that a S b and, for
some t 2 N and for some  > 0,
a0t =   at;
b0t =   bt;
a0j = aj, for all j 6= t;
b0j = bj, for all j 6= t:
Then a0 S b0 whenever bt 6= 0 and a0t > b0t.
We can now state the main characterisation of this section:
Theorem 3. A social opportunity ordering <S on BT satises Anonymity, Strong
Pareto, and Probabilistic Non-Interference if and only if <S is the Two-Step Nash
ordering <2N .
26In Mariotti and Veneziani [32, 33], we discuss in detail the conceptual underpinnings and implications
of this extended liberal principle.
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Proof : ()) It is immediate that <2N satises all three axioms.
(() Suppose that the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satises Anonymity,
Strong Pareto, and Probabilistic Non-Interference. For any a; b 2 BT , we shall prove
that (i) a 2N b) a S b; and (ii) a 2N b) a S b.
Claim (i). We need to consider two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that a; b 2 BT+ are such that
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt. If
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt = 1,
then the result follows from reexivity. Therefore suppose that 1 >
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt > 0.
If there exists a permutation  such that a = b, then the result follows fromAnonymity.
Therefore, suppose that there exists no permutation  such that a = b, and suppose, by
way of contradiction that a S b. By completeness, and without loss of generality, suppose
that a S b.
Let U(a; b) = ft 2 Nj at > btg and L(a; b) = ft 2 Nj at < btg. By construction, U(a; b) 6=
? and L(a; b) 6= ?. Take any k 2 U(a; b) and l 2 L(a; b). Suppose that ak > bl. (An
analogous argument applies in the other two subcases with ak  bl and al > bk, or with
bl  ak > bk  al.)
Consider a prole b which is a permutation  of b such that bk = bl. ByAnonymity and
transitivity, a S b. Then, from a; b construct a0; b0 as follows. Let a0k = ak, b0k = bk = bl,
where  = bk
ak
> 0; and a0j = aj, b
0
j = b

j , for all j 6= k. Because  = bkak < 1, a0; b0 2 BT+ and
a0k = bk. Further, by Probabilistic Non-Interference, a
0
k > b
0
k implies a
0 S b0.
Let  1 be the inverse of permutation  and let b1 =  1b0: Let a1  a0. By Anonymity
and transitivity, a1 S b1, and by construction QTt=1 a1t = QTt=1 b1t > 0. Further, E(a; b) =
ft 2 Nj at = btg  E(a1; b1) = ft 2 Nj a1t = b1tg. If U = fkg and L = flg, then bkak =
al
bl
and
so E(a1; b1) = N , yielding the desired contradiction by reexivity. Otherwise, the previous
argument can be iterated m times to obtain proles am; bm 2 BT+ such that am S bm, but
E(am; bm) = N , which again yields a contradiction by reexivity.
Case 2. Suppose that jP aj = jP bj < T and Qt2Pa at =Qt2P b bt. If jP aj = jP bj > 0, then
byAnonymity and transitivity, it is possible to apply the same reasoning as for case 1 to the
strictly positive entries of a; b 2 BT in order to obtain the desired result. If jP aj = jP bj = 0,
then a S b by reexivity.
Claim (ii). We need to consider two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that a; b 2 BT are such that jP aj = jP bj  T and Qt2Pa at > Qt2P b bt.
Then there exists a0 2 BT , where ak > a0k > 0, some k 2 P a, a0j = aj for all j 6= k, andQ
t2Pa a
0
t =
Q
t2P b bt. By Strong Pareto, a S a0, and therefore a S b follows from claim
(i) and transitivity.
Case 2. Suppose that a; b 2 BT are such that jP aj > jP bj. If jP bj = 0, the result
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follows from Strong Pareto. Therefore, suppose that jP bj > 0. By Anonymity and
transitivity, we can focus on the ranked proles a; b. Let k = min ft 2 N : at > 0g and let
l = min

t 2 N : bt > 0
	
. Since jP aj > jP bj, then k < l and ak > bk = 0. If aj  bj, for
all j, T  j  l, then the result follows from Strong Pareto. Therefore suppose that
bh > ah, some h  l, and, in contradiction with claim (ii), b S a. Then by Anonymity
and transitivity, consider prole b which is a permutation  of b such that bk = bh. Then,
from a; b construct a0; b0 2 BT as follows: a0k = ak, b0k = bk = bh, for some  2 (0; 1) such
that b0k = bh < ah, and a
0
j = aj, b
0
j = b

j all j 6= k. Since h  l > k, then b0k > a0k, and given
that ak 6= 0, by Probabilistic Non-Interference, it follows that b0 S a0.
Consider the ranked proles a0; b
0
. Note that k0 = min ft 2 N : a0t > 0g = k. ByAnonymity
and transitivity, b
0 S a0. If a0 > b0, then the desired contradiction follows from Strong
Pareto. Otherwise the previous argument can be iterated (always using the k-th entry of
the ranked proles a, a0, and so on) until the desired contradiction ensues.
This proves that jP aj > jP bj implies a <S b. Suppose, contrary to claim (ii), that a S b.
Then, for a su¢ ciently small " > 0, it is possible to construct a prole a" 2 BT such that a"t
= at  " > 0 for some t 2 N , a"j = aj all j 6= t, and jP a"j = jP aj > jP bj. By Strong Pareto
and transitivity, b S a" and the previous argument can be applied.
As the reader will have noticed, another major di¤erence in the conditions of Theorems 2
and 3, beside those already discussed, is the absence of Individual Sure Thing in the latter.
In fact, the two-step Nash ordering does not satisfy Individual Sure Thing, as the following
example demonstrates:
Example 1: a = ( 3
10
; 4
10
) 2N b = ( 2
10
; 6
10
) and a0 = ( 3
10
; 0) 2N b0 = ( 2
10
; 0). However,
8 2 (0; 1) : a = a+ (1  ) a0 2N b = b+ (1  ) b0:
In fact, 8 2 (0; 1) a = ( 3
10
;  4
10
) and b = ( 2
10
;  6
10
), and thus
Q2
t=1 a

t =
Q2
t=1 b

t .
This example implies immediately, together with Theorem 3, that it is impossible to
impose on a social opportunity ordering <S the four properties of Anonymity, Strong Pareto,
Probabilistic Non-Interference, and Individual Sure Thing.27
8 Relation with the SWO literature
The main goal of this paper is to study an operational version of opportunities and to
illustrate a new interpretation of the Nash criterion in this context. However, we would like
27Indeed, it can be proved that the clash between axioms remains even if one drops transitivity, Proba-
bilistic Non-Interference is restricted only to the Harm part, and Strong Pareto is weakened to monotonicity.
We thank J.C. Rodriguez Alcantud for pointing out these possible weakenings.
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to clarify the connection between our work and the literature on the Nash social welfare
orderings (SWOs) for the interested reader.
A rst observation to make is that the characterisation of Theorem 2 is quite separate from
those of the SWO literature. In the latter, a key axiom is typically one of Scale Invariance,
while Theorem 2 uses a combination of a liberal and a social rationality principle. These
principles are both formally and conceptually distinct from Scale Invariance properties.
The older part of the SWO literature focuses on the strictly positive orthant only (Boad-
way and Bruce [7]; Moulin [37]. See also Bosi et al [8]) and as we have seen proles with
zero entries create special technical problems. While still using a di¤erent domain (that of
the box of life) our setting is closer to two more recent contributions by Tsui and Weymark
[43] and Naumova and Yanovskaya [38], who explore larger domains.
Beside the one already mentioned, a further main technical di¤erence from these papers
is that we focus on Anonymity and do not assume any continuity property, whereas conti-
nuity axioms are central in both papers. Consequently, the arguments involved are entirely
di¤erent. Notably, we do not use any results from functional analysis, nor properties of social
welfare functions, since we cannot assume that our social ordering is representable.
To be more specic, Tsui and Weymark ([43], Theorem 5, p.252) elegantly characterise,
using techniques from functional analysis, Cobb-DouglasSWOs (of which the Nash ordering
is a special case) on RT by a continuity axiom, Weak Pareto and Ratio Scale Invariance. Once
transferred to the appropriate domain, our ranking can be seen as the anonymous case within
this class (obtained via Anonymity instead of continuity). They do not characterise SWOs
similar to our Two-Step Nash ordering. Naumova and Yanovskaya [38] provide a general
analysis of SWOs on RT that satisfy Ratio-Scale Invariance, and they do characterise some
lexicographic social welfare functions. Essentially, as compared to [43], they weaken the
continuity properties. For example, they focus on the requirement that continuity should
hold within orthants, which are unbounded sets of vectors whose individual components have
always the same sign, positive, negative or zero (therefore the vectors (1; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), and
(0; 1; 1), for instance, belong to the box of life B3 but to three di¤erent orthants in the sense
of [38]). The lexicographic SWOs characterised there di¤er markedly from ours in that they
require a linear ordering of the orthants and therefore vectors on the boundary of the box of
life (e.g., (1; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), and (0; 1; 1) in B3) will never be indi¤erent. Therefore, contrary
to our analysis, Anonymity is violated.
Finally, we recall a somewhat related approach in the specic context of health outcomes,
namely the use of QALYs(Quality-Adjusted Life Year) in health economics. QALYs are
numbers between zero and one that express the degree to which perfect health (with a value
normalised to one, whereas death is assigned zero) is attained. There is little axiomatic
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work on QALYs, but a recent one that is especially relevant in our context is by Moreno-
Ternero and Østerdal [35], who also propose a multiplicativeaggregation procedure. Aside
from the broad conceptual analogy, our work and theirs are quite distinct: they exclude
zero lifetimes while dealing with the zero boundary has been a main theme for us; and the
primitives of their model are not proles of QALYs but rather matrices made of duplets
each characterizing one individual, where the duplet refers to quantity and quality of life,
respectively.
9 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed formulating opportunities as chances of success, an interpretation close
to the standard use of the term by practitioners. This interpretation is easily amenable to
concrete measurement, suitable to the formulation of policy targets, and close to common
usage in the public debate.
We have highlighted some interesting conicts between principles and discussed how such
conicts can be overcome. We have shown that strong limits to inequality in the prole of
opportunities are implied by a liberal principle of justice and a property of social rationality.
Beside the inequality aversion (concavity) of the social criterion, even only one person failing
with certainty brings down the value of any prole to the minimum possible.
The use of the Nash social opportunity ordering acquires a natural interpretation in this
context as the probability that everybody succeeds. Although not purely egalitarian, this
maximise the probability of Heavencriterion is likely in practice to avoid major disparities in
opportunities, as proles involving very low opportunities for one individual will appear very
low in the social ordering. And, in the two-step renement we have proposed, Hell should
also be a sparsely populated place: that is, in practice, societies in which opportunities are
conned to a tiny elite should be frowned upon. These partially egalitarian conclusions look
stronger when one considers that they are obtained without any reference to issues of talent
or responsibility: the conclusions are partial but unconditional.28
One feature of our analysis is that in the Maximise the probability of Heaveninterpre-
tation of the Nash criterion we have treated individuals as independent experiments. Note
rst that this relates only to the interpretation and not to the results themselves: the Nash
criterion continues to follow from the axioms even without assuming such independence.
28One aim of our approach is to simplify the issue of egalitarianism in a context of social riskas much
as possible, which is obtained by assuming that success is binary. If social risk were to be considered
allowing individual outcomes to be measured along a utility scale, the denition of an appropriate concept
of egalitarianism would raise many additional thorny issues. See Fleurbaey [20] for a recent insightful
contribution.
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Secondly, at least to some extent, independence can be guaranteed by dening the notion of
success in such a way as to factor out the common variables a¤ecting success across individu-
als. For example, the chances of attaining a high paying job for the dustmans daughter and
for the doctors son are both a¤ected by the possibility of an economic recession, and must
therefore be partially correlated. To obtain independence, one might dene a high-paying
job independently for each state of nature or as an average across states. Thirdly, it seems
nevertheless of interest to consider a framework in which the input of the analysis is the
probability distribution over all logically conceivable proles of success and failure, so as
to include explicitly the possible correlations, instead of social preferences over proles of
marginaldistributions. This would be appropriate in cases where the correlation device is
a relevant variable under the control of the social decision maker - imagine for instance the
decision whether two o¢ cials on a wartime mission should travel on the same plane or on
separate planes (with each plane having a probability p of crashing). Correlations are at the
core of Fleurbaeys [20] study of risky social situations, which characterises a (mild) form
of ex-post egalitarianism, allowing individual outcomes to be measured along a utility scale,
for a xed and strictly positive vector of probabilities on a given set of states of the world.
An interesting development of our proposal would be to study the issue of correlations in
our framework, with variable probabilities and a restricted range of outcomes. This is left
for future research.
10 Appendix: Intergenerational justice and the Nash
criterion
The focus on joint probability of success seems, at the conceptual level, as attractive an
opportunity criterion when the agents are innite in number as when there is only a -
nite number of them. And yet, a large set of innite streams of probabilities yield a zero
probability of joint success, making the criterion vacuous for practical purposes.
We propose two solutions to this dilemma. They consist of adapting two well-known
methods for comparing innite streams of utilities: namely, the overtaking and the catching-
up criteria. In order to obtain the desired extensions of the social opportunity relations, we
add properties that permit a link with the innite case to (analogs of) the characterising
axioms of the nite case. In this way, we obtain an overtaking version of the Nash criterion
and a catching-up version of the Two-Step Nash criterion.
Almost without exception all uses of the Nash criterion we are aware of apply to a nite
number of agents, and therefore our proposals may be of interest in their own right.29
29The only partial exception we are aware of is Cato [11], which however only considers the Nash overtaking
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The previous notation is extended in a straightforward way to societies with an innite
set of agents N = f1; 2; :::g, with the following specic additions. Let B1 = [0; 1]1 denote
the set of countably innite streams of probabilities of success for agents in N. A prole
is now denoted 1a = (a1; a2; :::) 2 B1, where at is the probability of success of generation
t 2 N. For T 2 N, 1aT = (a1; :::; aT ) denotes the T -head of 1a and T+1a = (aT+1; aT+2; :::)
denotes its T -tail, so that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 a). For any x 2 B, 1x = (x; x; :::) 2 B1 denotes
the stream of constant probabilities equal to x. For all 1a 2 B1 and T 2 N, let P 1aT =
ft 2 f1; :::; Tg : at > 0g.
A permutation  is now a bijective mapping of N onto itself. A permutation  of N
is nite if there is T 2 N such that (t) = t, for all t > T , and  is the set of all nite
permutations of N. For any 1a 2 B1 and any , let  (1a) =
 
a(t)

t2N be a permutation of
1a. Finally, a relation <0 on B1 is an extension of < if 0 and 0.
We can now consider the rst innite horizon version of the Nash criterion.
The Nash overtaking criterion: For all 1a; 1b 2 B1, 1a N 1b, 9 ~T 2 N such that
8T  ~T : QTt=1 at =QTt=1 bt; and 1a N 1b, 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T : QTt=1 at >QTt=1 bt.
The characterisation results below are based on the following axioms which are analogous
to those used in the nite context.
Finite Anonymity: For all 1a 2 B1 and all  2 , (1a) S 1a.
Weak Dominance: For all 1a; 1b 2 B1 and all x; y 2 B : 1a > 1b ) 1a <S 1b, and
x < y ) 1y S (x; 2y).
Probabilistic Harm Principle: Let 1a; 1b 2 B1 be such that 1a = (1aT ; T+1b) for
some T 2 N, and 1a S 1b; and let 1a0; 1b0 2 B1 be such that for some t 2 N, and some
 2 (0; 1),
a0t =   at,
b0t =   bt,
a0j = aj , for all j 6= t;
b0j = bj , for all j 6= t:
Then 1b0 S 1a0 whenever a0t > b0t.
Individual Sure Thing: Let 1a; 1b 2 B1 be such that 1a = (1aT ; T+1b) for some
T 2 N, and 1a <S 1b and let 1a0; 1b0 2 B1 be such that for some t  T , a0j = aj and b0j = bj,
for all j 6= t, and 1a0 <S 1b0. Then
criterion on the strictly positive orthant.
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8 2 (0; 1) :  1a+ (1  ) 1a0 <S  1b+ (1  ) 1b0;
with  1a + (1  ) 1a0 S  1b + (1  ) 1b0 if at least one of the two preferences in the
premise is strict.
Like in the nite case, Strong Pareto must be weakened to avoid impossibilities: Weak
Dominance is one such weakening. Similar weakenings have been used in the literature (see
e.g. Basu and Mitra [4], who use a slightly stronger version of the property we propose. For
a discussion, see Asheim [2]).
In addition to the above axioms, a weak consistency requirement is imposed.
Weak Consistency: For all 1a;1 b 2 B1: (i) 9 ~T 2 N : (1aT ;T+1 1) S (1bT ;T+1 1)
8T  ~T ) 1a S 1b; (ii) 9 ~T 2 N : (1aT ;T+1 1) S (1bT ;T+1 1) 8T  ~T ) 1a S 1b.
Weak Consistency provides a link to the nite setting by transforming the comparison of
two innite proles into an innite number of comparisons of proles each containing a nite
number of generations. Axioms similar to Weak Consistency are common in the literature
(see, e.g., Basu and Mitra [5], Asheim [2], Asheim and Banerjee [3]).30
Finally, the next axiom requires that <S be complete at least when comparing elements
of B1 with the same tail. This requirement is weak and it seems uncontroversial, for it is
desirable to be able to rank as many proles as possible.31
Minimal Completeness: For all 1a; 1b 2 B1, 1a 6= 1b : T+1a = T+1b for some T 2 N )
1a <S 1b or 1b <S 1a.
Before proving our main characterisation result, we state the following Lemma which
extends to B1 the equivalent result obtained in the nite context.32
Lemma 2 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering <S on B1 satisfy Finite Anonymity,
Weak Dominance, Probabilistic Harm Principle, Individual Sure Thing, and
Minimal Completeness. Then: for all 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that T+1a = T+1b for some
T 2 N, [at = 0; bt0 = 0; some t; t0 2 f1; :::; Tg]) 1a S 1b:
30Under Strong Pareto normally one needs only part (i) of Weak Consistency (or of a similar axiom),
see e.g. Asheim and Banerjee [3], in particular Proposition 2. Here we only assume Weak Dominance and
therefore the results in [3] do not hold. We thank Geir Asheim for alerting us to this issue.
31Lombardi et al [28] use Minimal Completeness to characterise the innite leximin and maximin social
welfare relations. Also, we note that all binary relations considered in this section are incomplete. However,
by Szpilrajns Theorem, the set of ordering extensions we characterise is obviously not empty.
32The proof of Lemma 2 is a straightforward modication of the proof of Lemma 1 and therefore is omitted.
Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Next, we derive a useful implication of Weak Dominance and Individual Sure
Thing.
Lemma 3 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering <S on B1 satisfyWeak Dominance
and Individual Sure Thing. Then: for all 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that T+1a = T+1b = T+11
for some T 2 N, 1aT  1bT ) 1a S 1b:
Proof : We proceed by induction on T .
1. (T = 1) Take any 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that a1 > b1 and 2a = 2b = 21. By Weak
Dominance, 11 S (b1;2 1), and so if a1 = 1, the result immediately follows. Suppose
a1 < 1. By reexivity, 1b S 1b. Hence, by Individual Sure Thing it follows that for all
 2 (0; 1) : 11+(1  ) 1b S 1b+(1  ) 1b = 1b, and noting that 1 > a1 > b1, we obtain
1a S 1b.
2. (Inductive step.) Suppose that the result holds for T 1  1. Consider any 1a;1 b 2 B1
such that T+1a = T+1b = T+11 for some T > 1, and 1aT  1bT . By the induction hypothesis,
(1aT 1;T 1) S (1bT 1;T 1). By Weak Dominance, (1bT 1;T 1) <S (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1) and
therefore by transitivity, (1aT 1;T 1) S (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1). If aT = 1, the desired result
follows. Therefore suppose that aT < 1. By Weak Dominance, (1aT 1; bT ;T+1 1) <S
(1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1). But then, by Individual Sure Thing it follows that for all  2 (0; 1) :
 (1aT 1;T 1) + (1  ) (1aT 1; bT ;T+1 1) S  (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1) + (1  ) (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1) =
(1bT ;T+1 1), and noting that 1 > aT > bT , we obtain 1a S 1b.
Given Lemmas 2 and 3, the next Theorem proves that the above axioms jointly charac-
terise the Nash overtaking quasi-ordering.
Theorem 4. (NASH OVERTAKING) A social opportunity quasi-ordering <S on
B1 satises Finite Anonymity, Weak Dominance, Probabilistic Harm Principle,
Individual Sure Thing,Weak Consistency, andMinimal Completeness if and only
if <S is an extension of <N.
Proof: ()) Let <N<S. It is immediate that <S meets Finite Anonymity and
Weak Dominance. By observing that <N is complete for comparisons between proles
with the same tail, it is also easy to see that <S satisesWeak Consistency andMinimal
Completeness. We need to show that <S meets Probabilistic Harm Principle and
Individual Sure Thing.
To prove that <S satises Probabilistic Harm Principle, take any 1a;1 b 2 B1 such
that 1a = (1abT ;bT+1 b) for some bT 2 N, and 1a S 1b. Since <N is complete for comparisons
between proles with the same tail, it follows that 1a N 1b. Then, let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be
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such that for some t0 2 N, and some  2 (0; 1), a0t0 = at0, b0t0 = bt0, a0j = aj; all j 6= t0, and
b0j = bj; all j 6= t0. We need to prove that 1b0 S 1a0 whenever a0t0 > b0t0.
By denition, 1a N 1b implies that 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T :
QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 bt.
Consider any T 0  max
n
t0; ~T
o
. Then note that 8T  T 0, QTt=1 at > QTt=1 bt impliesQT
t=1 a
0
t = 
QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 b
0
t = 
QT
t=1 bt, for all  2 (0; 1). Hence 1a0 N

1b
0, and
since <N<S, it follows that 1b0 S 1a0.
To prove that <S satises Individual Sure Thing, take any 1a;1 b 2 B1 such that
1a = (1abT ;bT+1 b) for some bT 2 N, and 1a <S 1b, and let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be such that for some
t0  bT , a0j = aj and b0j = bj, all j 6= t0, and 1a0 <S 1b0. We show that
8 2 (0; 1) : 1a = 1a+ (1  ) 1a0 <S 1b = 1b+ (1  ) 1b0;
with 1a S 1b if at least one of the two preferences in the premise is strict.
First of all, since <N<S and <N is complete for comparisons between proles with
the same tail, it follows that 1a <N

1b and 1a0 <N

1b
0.
Next, note that by construction, aj = aj = a
0
j and b

j = bj = b
0
j, all j 6= t0, at0 =
at0 + (1  ) a0t0, and bt0 = bt0 + (1  ) b0t0, t0  bT . Therefore for all T  bT , QTt=1 at =
(at0 + (1  ) a0t0)
Q
t6=t0 at = 
QT
t=1 at + (1  )
QT
t=1 a
0
t. A similar argument shows thatQT
t=1 b

t = 
QT
t=1 bt + (1  )
QT
t=1 b
0
t.
Suppose that bT+1a = bT+1b bT+10. By denition, and noting that bT+1a = bT+1b, 1a <N
1b implies that either 8T  bT : QTt=1 at > QTt=1 bt, or 8T  bT : QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt. And
a similar argument holds for 1a0 <N

1b
0. Therefore if 8T  bT : QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt andQT
t=1 a
0
t =
QT
t=1 b
0
t, it follows that 8T  bT : QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt . Instead, if either 8T bT : QTt=1 at > QTt=1 bt, or 8T  bT : QTt=1 a0t > QTt=1 b0t, it follows that 8T  bT : QTt=1 at >QT
t=1 b

t . In the former case, 1a
 N 1b, whereas in the latter case 1a N 1b. Since
<N<S, the desired result follows.
Suppose that aeT = beT = 0 for some eT > bT . Then 8T  eT : QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt =QT
t=1 a
0
t =
QT
t=1 b
0
t = 0, and so 8T  eT : QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt = 0. This implies 1a N 1b
and the desired result again follows from <N<S.
(() Suppose that <S on B1 satises Finite Anonymity,Weak Dominance, Proba-
bilistic Harm Principle, Individual Sure Thing,Weak Consistency, andMinimal
Completeness. We show that <N<S, that is, for all 1a; 1b 2 B1,
1a N 1b) 1a S 1b, (1)
and
1a N 1b) 1a S 1b: (2)
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Consider (1). Take any 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T :
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt.
We consider two cases.
Case 1. 1a  10 and 1b  10. If 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T :
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt,
then eT+1a = eT+1b. Suppose, in contradiction, that 1a S 1b. ByMinimal Completeness,
and without loss of generality, suppose that 1a S 1b. Fix T 0  ~T . With an argument
analogous to the nite case, we can useWeak Dominance, Probabilistic Harm Prin-
ciple, Individual Sure Thing, Finite Anonymity, Minimal Completeness, and
transitivity iteratively to derive proles 1am;1 bm 2 B1 such that 1am = (1amT 0 ;T 0+1 a) S
1b
m = (1b
m
T 0 ;T 0+1 b), but 1a
m
T 0 = 1b
m
T 0 which contradicts reexivity.
Case 2. aT 0 = 0 for some T 0 2 N and bT 00 = 0 for some T 00 2 N. Take any T 
max fT 0; T 00g and consider the proles (1aT ;T+1 1) ; (1bT ;T+1 1) 2 B1. By Lemma 2, (1aT ;T+1 1) S
(1bT ;T+1 1). Because this is true for all T  max fT 0; T 00g,Weak Consistency implies 1a S
1b.
Consider (2). Take any 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T :
QT
t=1 at >QT
t=1 bt. Take any T  ~T and consider the proles (1aT ;T+1 1) ; (1bT ;T+1 1) 2 B1. Let
1x  (1bT ;T+1 1) and 1y  (1aT ;T+1 1).
Note that
QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 bt implies that 1aT  10T . Hence there is a su¢ ciently small
" 2 BT+ such that 1a"T = (a1  "1; a2  "2; :::; aT   "T ) 2 BT and
QT
t=1 (at   "t) =
QT
t=1 bt. By
(1), it follows that 1y  (1a"T ;T+1 1) S 1x. By Lemma 3, 1y S 1y and therefore 1y S 1x
by transitivity.
Therefore (1aT ;T+1 1) S (1bT ;T+1 1) and since the argument holds for any T  ~T , it
follows fromWeak Consistency that 1a S 1b.
Next, we provide an extension of the Two-Step Nash criterion to the innite context in
the framework of Bossert et al [10]. As announced, the characterisation is based on innite
versions of the axioms used in Section 7. In addition to Finite Anonymity, we consider
Strong Pareto: For all 1a; 1b 2 B1; 1a > 1b) 1a S 1b.
Probabilistic Non-Interference: Let 1a;1 b 2 B1 be such that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 b) for
some T 2 N, and 1a S 1b; and let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be such that for some t 2 N and some  > 0,
a0t =   at,
b0t =   bt,
a0j = aj , for all j 6= t;
b0j = bj , for all j 6= t:
Then 1a0 S 1b0 whenever bt 6= 0 and a0t > b0t.
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For each T 2 N, let the Two-Step Nash ordering on BT be denoted as <2NF . In anal-
ogy with Bossert et al [10], the Two-Step Nash social opportunity relation on B1 can be
formulated as follows. Dene <2NT  B1 B1 by letting, for all 1a;1 b 2 B1,
1a <2NT 1b, 1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b. (3)
The relation <2NT is reexive and transitive for all T 2 N. Then the Two-Step Nash social
opportunity relation is <2N=
S
T2N <2NT .
Theorem 5. (NASH CATCHING-UP) A social opportunity ordering <S on B1
satises Finite Anonymity, Strong Pareto, and Probabilistic Non-Interference if
and only if <S is an ordering extension of <2N.
Proof: (The proof adapts the one given for the leximin catching up by Bossert et al [10].
We report it for clarity.)
()) We rst prove that the relations <2NT and 2NT are nested. That is, for all T 2 N
<2NT <2NT+1; (4)
and
2NT 2NT+1 : (5)
To prove (4), suppose that 1a <2NT 1b: By denition, 1a <2NT 1b , 1aT <2NF 1bT and
T+1a  T+1b. Then, either 1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b or 1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b.
In either case, it is immediate to prove that 1aT+1 <2NT+1 1bT+1 and T+2a  T+2b, and so
1a <2NT+1 1b:
To prove (5), suppose that 1a 2NT 1b. By denition at least one of the following state-
ments is true:
1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b (6)
1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a > T+1b: (7)
If (6) holds, then it is immediate to prove that 1aT+1 2NF 1bT+1 and T+2a  T+2b and so
1a 2NT+1 1b.
So, suppose (7) holds but (6) does not. If aT+1 = bT+1, then 1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a >
T+1b implies 1aT+1 <2NF 1bT+1 and T+2a > T+2b. If aT+1 > bT+1, then 1aT <2NF 1bT and
T+1a > T+1b implies 1aT+1 2NF 1bT+1 and T+2a  T+2b. In either case 1a 2NT+1 1b.
In summary, we have proved that <2NT <2NT+1 and 2NT 2NT+1 :
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Then, using the same arguments as in Bossert et al. ([10], Theorem 1, p.584) it can be
shown that <2N is reexive and transitive, and that it satises the following property ([10],
p.586, equation (14)):
8 1a;1 b 2 B1 : 9T 2 N such that 1a 2NT 1b, 1a 2N

1b. (8)
In order to complete the proof of necessity, we need to prove that any ordering extension <S
of <2N satises the properties in the statement.
It it is immediate that <S meets Strong Pareto and Finite Anonymity. To prove that
Probabilistic Non-Interference is satised, let 1a;1 b 2 B1 be such that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 b)
for some T 2 N and 1a S 1b. Suppose that 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 are such that for some t0 2 N,
and some  > 0, a0t0 = at0, b
0
t0 = bt0, and a
0
j = aj , b
0
j = bj , all j 6= t0. We prove that if
<2N<S then 1a0 S 1b0 whenever bt0 6= 0 and a0t0 > b0t0.
Since <2N is complete for comparisons between proles with the same tail, it follows
that 1a 2N 1b. Therefore by property (8), there exists T 0 2 N such that 1a 2NT 0 1b:
Without loss of generality, let T 0 = T . Then 1a 2NT 1b implies 1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a =
T+1b. If jP 1aT j > jP 1bT j, then jP 1a0T j = jP 1aT j > jP 1b0T j = jP 1bT j. If jP 1aT j = jP 1bT j 
T and
Q
t2P 1aT at >
Q
t2P 1bT bt, then jP 1a
0
T j = jP 1aT j = jP 1b0T j = jP 1bT j, Q
t2P 1a0T a
0
t =

Q
t2P 1aT at >
Q
t2P 1b0T b
0
t = 
Q
t2P 1bT bt. In both cases, 1a
0
T 2NF 1b0T and T+1a0 = T+1b0, so
that 1a0 2NT 1b0 and therefore by property (8), 1a0 2N 1b0. The result follows noting that
<2N<S :
(() Suppose that <S is an ordering on B1 that satises Finite Anonymity, Strong
Pareto, and Probabilistic Non-Interference. Fix T 2 N and 1c 2 B1, and dene the
relation <T
1c
 BT BT as follows. For any 1a, 1b 2 B1,
1aT <T1c 1bT , (1aT ;T+1 c) <S (1bT ;T+1 c) .
<T
1c
is an ordering because <S is. Moreover, for any 1a, 1b 2 B1,
1aT T1c 1bT , (1aT ;T+1 c) S (1bT ;T+1 c) .
The three axioms imply that <T
1c
must satisfy the T -person versions of the axioms. Hence,
using the characterisation of the T -person Two-Step Nash social opportunity ordering in
Theorem 3, it follows that
<T
1c
=<2NF :
Because T and 1c were chosen arbitrarily, the latter statement is true for all T 2 N and for
any 1c 2 B1.
To prove that <S is an ordering extension of <2N, we rst establish that <2N<S.
Suppose that 1a, 1b 2 B1 are such that 1a <2N 1b. By the denition of <2N, there exists
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a T such that 1a <2NT 1b, that is, 1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b. Then, since <T1c=<2NF , it
follows that 1aT <T1c 1bT and T+1a  T+1b, for all 1c 2 B1. Choosing 1c = 1b and using the
denition of <T
1c
, it follows that (1aT ;T+1 b) <S (1bT ;T+1 b). Because T+1a  T+1b, either
reexivity or Strong Pareto, together with transitivity imply (1aT ;T+1 a) <S (1bT ;T+1 b).
The proof is completed by showing that 2NS. Suppose that 1a, 1b 2 B1 are such
that 1a 2N 1b. By (8), there exists T 2 N such that 1a 2NT 1b. Hence, at least one of (6)
or (7) is true.
If (6) holds, since <T
1c
=<2NF , it follows that 1aT T1c 1bT and T+1a  T+1b, for all 1c 2 B1.
Choosing 1c = 1b and using the denition of T1c, it follows that (1aT ;T+1 b) S (1bT ;T+1 b).
Then using either reexivity or Strong Pareto, together with transitivity as in the proof
of <2N<S, we obtain (1aT ;T+1 a) S (1bT ;T+1 b).
If (7) holds, since <T
1c
=<2NF , it follows that 1aT <T1c 1bT and T+1a > T+1b, for all 1c 2 B1.
Choosing 1c = 1b and using the denition of <T1c, it follows that (1aT ;T+1 b) <S (1bT ;T+1 b).
Then by Strong Pareto and transitivity, it follows that (1aT ;T+1 a) S (1bT ;T+1 b).
Therefore 2NS, which concludes the proof.
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